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TEN MOONS: CONSCIOUSNESS AND INTENTIONALITY IN THE
ĀLAMBANAPARĪKṢĀ AND ITS COMMENTARIES
Jay L. Garﬁeld
Smith College; Harvard Divinity School; Melbourne University; Central
Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies

In the Ālambanaparīkṣā, Dignāga (480–540) deploys the familiar simile of a
double moon to illustrate something that appears to exist, and appears to be the
cause of perception, but which is not substantially real. The example serves in
the initial argument as a dr. ṣt. ānta, or example of concomitance, but, as we shall
see, it also functions as a broader simile to illustrate a variety of speciﬁc
positions both in Dignāga’s autocommentary and in the subsequent commentarial literature, and in particular in the context of the commentary on verse 6,
as opposed to verse 2 where the example is introduced:
It does not come from that of which it has the appearance
Because that is not substantially real, like a double moon. (2ab)1

In what follows, I shall explore ﬁve different uses of the two moons simile
that arise in Dignāga’s own text and in its Indian and Tibetan commentaries.
We shall see that it is used as a vehicle not only for articulating idealism but
also to explore cognitive illusion, the perceptual process, and even ethics.
This exploration will give us some sense of the richness of commentarial
practice as a way of using texts as sources of philosophical insight beyond
what their authors may have intended, and even sometimes to make points
with which the author of the root text would have disagreed. Commentary is
a vehicle not only for the preservation and clariﬁcation of ideas, but also for
philosophical progress.

I. Dignāga on His Own Simile
There appears to be no real mystery about what this simile is meant to
illustrate. Dignāga himself explains the point pretty directly in the autocommentary:
When a person sees a double moon because of defective sense faculties, there
may be an appearance of that, but it is not the object of that cognition. In the
same way, a collection is not a percept because it is not substantially real and,
for that reason, is not a cause. (p. 42)

Dignāga in the ﬁrst three verses of the Ālambanaparīkṣā considers two
possible accounts of a percept (ālambana) proposed by those who think the
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percept is external: it could be individual fundamental particles, or it could
be a collection of them:
Even if sensory cognition were caused by fundamental particles,
It would not have fundamental particles as its object.
Because they do not appear to cognition,
Any more than the sense faculties do. (1)
It does not come from that of which [it] has the appearance
Because, like a double moon, collections are not substantially real.
Thus, neither kind of external object
Makes sense as an object of cognition. (2) (p. 151)2

The percept must satisfy two conditions: it must be what appears in
perception and it must be the cause of perception.3 Here he argues that a
collection of fundamental particles cannot be the percept because it cannot
be the cause of perception; it cannot be the cause because it is not
substantially real, and the example of the double moon is brought in to
make that point. When I see a double moon, because I am either drunk or
cross-eyed, while a double moon appears in perception, no double moon is
the cause of perception, simply because there is no real double moon.
One might think that any discussion of this example would stop here. The
author himself tells us how to understand it, and does so in very clear terms. But
one would be wrong. The Indian and Tibetan commentarial tradition grounded
in this text comprises commentaries by Dharmapāla (sixth century), Vinītadeva
(645–715), the third Gungtang Rinpoche (1762–1823), Ngawang Dendar
(1759–1840), and Yeshes Thabkhas (1932–).4 Each reads the double moon
differently, particularly in the context of their respective discussions of verse 6.
Their distinct readings help us to see just how much philosophy is happening in
the eight verses this text comprises. In the present essay I compare these
readings and reﬂect on what they can tell us about intentionality. This series of
interpretations demonstrates the fecundity of the commentarial genre and of the
scholastic approach to philosophy. In particular, I hope that this tour through
the uses of this analogy, as a simile for cognition in the series of commentaries,
each occurring in the context of the commentary to the sixth verse (not the
second in which the ﬁgure occurs as the dr. ṣt. ānta)—
An internal cognitive object,
Which appears to be external, is the object
Because it is cognition itself,
And because it is its condition. . . .

—will show that the genre of commentary need not be understood as a
recovery of the intent of the author of the original text (and then judged for
its faithfulness to that intent), but rather can be understood as creative
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philosophical dialogue with that text and with others in the commentarial
tradition. That, after all, is how philosophical literature develops in any
tradition, including that of contemporary Buddhist Studies. Were we to do
nothing but speculate on Dignāga’s intent, there would be little purpose in
studying the Ālambanaparīkṣā, and the same is true of its Indian and Tibetan
commentators.5

II. Vinītadeva: An Analogy for Idealism
Vinītadeva reads Dignāga’s text as a direct argument for idealism. He writes:
Therefore, because this treatise is composed in order to refute the existence of
external objects and prove the existence of internal ones, by implication the
purpose is precisely these refutations and proofs. (p. 79)

So, when he comes to interpret the two moons as a simile in verse 6, he
reads it as an argument for idealism. While in the commentary to verse 2
Vinītadeva follows Dignāga closely,6 he returns to this simile in the context
of his commentary on verse 6,7 a context in which subsequent commentators also discuss the simile:
The phrase “appears to be external” means “it manifests as if it were external;
that is, as if it were separate from cognition.” A condition of its appearance in
that way is the appearance of space. Space appears to cognition as if it were
separate from cognition, and so it reveals the apprehended object. For example,
when a reﬂection of the moon appears on the surface of a mirror, it appears as
if it were separate, as though it were in a well, by virtue of a reﬂection of space.
(p. 95)

Vinītadeva is imagining the second moon as the reﬂection of the moon in
the mirror. That moon appears to exist in space; space itself appears to be
reﬂected in the mirror. But of course there is no space in the mirror—only a
ﬂat, polished surface. The moon’s spatiality is illusory. The reﬂected moon
here is the simile for the percept. What we perceive appears to be in space,
just as the mirrored moon does. But just as in that case something can
appear to be spatially located, behind the mirror, or at the bottom of a well,
when it is not, our own percepts can appear to be in space, even when they
are not.
While we might have thought that the simile merely indicates that the
causes of perception and the appearances in perception can come apart,
Vinītadeva shows that it can also be recruited to show that the
appearance of externality is no guarantee of externality, and indeed that
nothing that appears to us can by itself give us any reason to believe that
it is external.
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III. Gungtang: Cognitive Illusion
The third commentator was an able Geluk exegete, and also a bit of a
prodigy. He composed his Ornament for Dignāga’s Thought Regarding
Investigation of the Percept (dMigs pa brtag pa’i ’grel pa phyogs glang
dgongs rgyan) when he was only twenty-three years old. His commentary is
very brief, and he presents it just as a set of notes, but it addresses some
difﬁcult questions in Dignāga’s text, including the relationship between mind
and matter, the nature of consciousness, and the structure of intentionality
(see Duckworth et al. 2016).
Gungtang is concerned in his commentary not only to explain Dignāga’s
own argument from the standpoint of the Yogācāra school into which Geluk
doxography slots him, but also to show how his arguments can be useful to
a Mādhyamika. He presents a charitable reading of the text, and mines it for
insights, rather than taking it as a target for Madhyamaka attack. One of the
points of dispute between Yogācāra and Madhyamaka, according to the
Geluk reading, is whether cognition is necessarily reﬂexive (rang rig, a term
that translates the Sanskrit svasaṃvedanā). Yogācāra philosophers, including
Dignāga, argue that it is, although there is considerable disagreement among
them regarding the nature of that reﬂexivity (as well as considerable metadisagreement among Tibetan and Western commentators about each of the
positions (Coseru 2012; Thompson 2011; Williams 1997). According to
Candrakīrti as well as Tsongkhapa, the founder of the Geluk school, and all
of his followers, no Mādhyamika accepts the reﬂexivity of awareness
(Garﬁeld 2006, 2015, 2016; Jinpa 2002).
Gungtang introduces the double moon analogy as a response to an
anticipated question: how can we understand the nature of consciousness in the absence of reﬂexivity. This question reﬂects an interest
in using Dignāga’s text as a basis for exploring Geluk epistemology, as
well as a willingness to read Dignāga against himself, using his own
analogy to undermine the theory of reﬂexivity that Dignāga himself
introduced:
“What is the percept?” It is deﬁned as follows: it is nothing other than a selfpresenting internal apprehension—an entity that is a cognitive object.
Suppose someone asks: “Because reﬂexive action is inconsistent, how could
it appear?” The representation does not appear as it exists. For example, when
an image of the moon appears in a mirror, spatiality also appears. The moon
appears to be different from its [the mirror’s] action of reﬂecting. Although it
[the moon] is apprehended with an appearance of externality, the object is that
which exists internally. (p. 115)

Let us examine this terse passage with care. Gungtang begins by presenting
a Geluk deﬁnition of the percept (dmigs pa) as understood in the Yogācāra
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system. The percept is a cognitive object (shes bya’i dngos po). That is, it is
the intentional content of perception, an object of knowledge. It is also
deﬁned as a self-presenting internal apprehension (nang gi rdzin pa’i rang
mdangs). Gungtang, following Geluk doxography, would agree that according to any Yogācāra the percept is internal—that is, that perception is
mediated by representations, and that the immediate object of perception
is cognitively constructed. So he would agree that the percept in this system
is the immediate object of awareness, not a distal object. Moreover, on this
point, Geluk epistemology is in agreement with Yogācāra as Geluk
doxographers read it, inasmuch as they adopt a representational theory of
perceptual awareness.8 The problem arises with the idea that that the
percept is self-presenting (rang mdangs).
No Geluk could accept that this is a correct analysis of the percept, for,
following Tsongkhapa, Gelukpa epistemology rejects the cogency of the
doctrine of reﬂexive awareness (Garﬁeld 2006). Here Gungtang is interested
not only in explicating Dignāga’s view, but in getting an accurate account
of perceptual consciousness, an account that draws on what he sees as
correct about Yogācāra, but which eschews the commitment to reﬂexivity.
So, in response to the imagined query about how one explains consciousness in the absence of reﬂexivity, Gungtang deploys the double moon, this
time not only to defend Dignāga’s view that representations are deceptive
regarding the externality of objects, but also to criticize the Yogācāra
position that our representations are in another sense self-revealing, that we
are immediately aware of them as the representations they are. He ﬁrst
asserts that the representation does not appear as it exists (ji ltar gnas pa’i
rnam pa’i snang ba ma yin te). To exist in one way and to appear in another
is the very deﬁnition of a deceptive phenomenon. So, representations,
Gungtang is asserting, are deceptive, not simply in the sense that they may
represent objects that do not exist as they are represented (as a distortion in
the case of a hallucination, or for an idealist the case of apparent
externality), but in the stronger sense that the representations themselves
do not exist as they appear. The mind, that is, is opaque: its own contents
do not exist as they appear.
This doctrine of the opacity of mind, familiar in the West since the work
of Sellars (1963) and articulated most forcefully by Churchland (1978) and
Carruthers (2011) was defended by Tsongkhapa in Tibet. It is a stark
rejection of the view that the mind is immediately present to itself. And this
is where Gungtang uses the simile of the two moons. The central line is that
“the moon appears to be different from its action of reﬂecting” (shar bas
byed pa las zla ba rgyang ste).
This spells out the precise respect in which the structure of consciousness is opaque, and it is an elegant point. When we see the moon in the
mirror, it appears that we see two things: the mirror and the moon reﬂected
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in the mirror. That duality of act and object seems to be built into the very
structure of intentionality, and is captured in Brentano’s metaphor of
intentional inexistence, with its roots in the account of mental acts common
to Berkeley and Descartes (see Sellars 1977): the cognitive act is one thing,
and the object of the act another. But, Gungtang claims, this gets things
wrong. The reﬂected moon and the reﬂecting mirror are not two different
things, despite appearing to be so. There is only the mirror and its act of
reﬂection; there is no second moon in the mirror.
To put this point in more contemporary terms, when we say that I
imagine a tree, the word “tree” appears in the internal accusative case. That
is, the relation of intentional verbs to their objects is akin to the relation of
“to dance” to its object, and not to that of “to kick” with its object. When I
kick a ball, there is a difference between the act of kicking and the ball:
they are two distinct things, and the word ball appears in the external
accusative case. When I dance a jig, on the other hand, there are not two
things, the dancing and the jig; rather, I dance jig-wise. The word jig
appears in the internal accusative case.
Similarly, when I imagine a tree, according to this view I imagine treewise, and when I see the moon I see moon-wise. Intentional verbs take
internal accusative objects, not external accusative. This has come to be
known as the adverbial theory of mental states. Gungtang uses the mirror
analogy to point out that the fact that our minds appear to us in the guise
of mental acts with mental objects does not mean that they are so. Selfpresentation, he suggests, is therefore an illusion. Our mental states appear
to us in one way—as acts directed toward distinct objects, but exist in
another, as acts with a character deﬁned by their ostensible objects.
Dignāga’s own metaphor has been delightfully turned against him, and the
epistemological asymmetry between the inner and the outer that grounds
idealism—immediate access to a self-presenting inner, as opposed to
mediated access to a distant outer—has been rejected. Paradoxically, the
fact that illusion extends even to the inner is a premise in the defense of
realism; Gungtang hence offers us a way to understand Geluk realism
about external objects through his presentation of a theory of consciousness: not a theory that elevates the epistemic status of the external, but one
that articulates the epistemology of the inner as less secure than it might
appear to be, hence establishing a parity between the inner and outer
worlds.

IV. Ngawang Dendar and the Causes of Perception
Ngawang Dendar (ngag dbang bstan dar), a distinguished Mongolian
scholar and monastic administrator, writes a masterful commentary on
Dignāga’s text, with yet another deployment of the two moons, also at
odds with Dignāga’s own use, and also in the service of an analysis of the
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structure of intentionality, which he analyzes in terms of causation. Here is
his discussion:
A collection of many particles does not produce a sensory cognition in this
way, because it is not substantially real. For example, when a person sees a
double moon because of defective sense faculties—that is, because his senses
have been damaged by an eye disease—it is just a single moon appearing to be
double. But even though it is a single moon appearing as double to a sensory
cognition, the single moon is not the cause of the sensory cognition; and, for
that reason, it also is not the object that is called the percept condition of that
cognition. (pp. 151–152)

Dendar begins with the point that Dignāga makes: collections are not
substantially real, as they merely supervene on that which is real—the
fundamental particles that constitute them. They therefore have no causal
powers: all of the causality occurs at the most fundamental level, and there
is no extra causality at higher levels. This is a familiar reductionist account
of reality and of causation, common in Sautrāntrika Buddhism as well as in
some corners of contemporary metaphysics and philosophy of science
(Churchland 1978; Kim 1998).9
This is important because, as we saw at the beginning of this discussion,
one of the two necessary conditions of a percept is that it is the cause
perceptual experience. But this only introduces Dendar’s concern, which is
the actual cause of perceptual experience. Dignāga’s critique of the two
initial positions regarding the cause of perception suggests that each of them
fails one of the criteria: wholes appear to, but do not cause, perceptual
consciousness; fundamental particles cause, but do not appear to, perceptual
consciousness. Dignāga’s solution is that karmic predispositions—which
Dendar argues must be located in the foundation consciousness—cause
perceptual experience and themselves become appearances; the percept is
thus in Dignāga’s view always an internal transformation of consciousness.
Dendar argues instead that neither the particles nor the collection can
cause perceptual experience. Because, as we are about to see, contra
Dignāga, the fundamental particles are not the causes of perceptual
experience; fundamental particles fail both tests for the percept, not only
one; and collections are not caused to appear even by the fundamental
particles that constitute them. And he takes the analogy of the two moons to
show this. He will draw the further conclusion that while Dignāga may be
right that the cause of perceptual experience is internal, to say that it is the
ripening of a potential may be misleading.
Dendar emphasizes in his reading of the example that the cause of the
perception of the double moon is neither a double moon nor a single moon,
but rather that the subjects’ “senses have been damaged by eye disease.”
Let’s see how this goes. Suppose that you develop an eye disease as a
consequence of which you experience double vision, or, perhaps to take a
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more common case, you have a few too many drinks after a faculty meeting.
You look up at the sky and see a double moon, and wonder why you are
seeing two moons. How would you explain this to yourself? You would not,
Dendar suggests, say “oh, I see a double moon because there are two
moons in the sky” (unless you were doing more than just drinking); nor
would you say “I see two moons because there is one moon.” That wouldn’t
explain anything. Instead, you would say “I saw two moons because I had
too much to drink.”
This is what Dendar has in mind. It is the condition of your sense
faculties, not anything in the external world, nor anything in your foundation
consciousness, that causes you to see the two moons.10 To understand
perceptual consciousness, Dendar suggests, we should look neither to the
distal object nor to our past karma, but rather to the sense organs, the sense
faculties, and the structure of our minds that give rise to cognition. To
understand the nature of the mind, in short, we should do cognitive science.
Note that this follows quite naturally from Gungtang’s reading of the
analogy. Gungtang emphasizes the fact that we cannot know our own minds
just by looking; our cognitive states are deceptive phenomena. Dendar
doubles down, pointing out that the causes of our sensory experience are
the sense faculties themselves. This naturalism about perception extends the
doctrine of the opacity of the mind, and provides further grounds to reject
idealism. For we cannot pretend that the operations of the sense faculties
are immediately present to us, or are even cognitively transparent. But our
sense faculties are physical phenomena that operate through physical
contact with distal objects to produce perceptual experience. So, once
again, a Geluk exegete uses Dignāga’s own example to explore more deeply
the structure of consciousness. But when we follow through the implications
of this exploration, we see that in the end it also undermines Dignāga’s own
epistemology of the inner and his idealist ontology.

V. Yeshes Thabkhas on Pramāṇa and Ethics
Geshe Yeshes Thabkhas is a contemporary Tibetan scholar. His specialty is
Indian Buddhist philosophy, which he has taught for decades at the Central
University of Tibetan Studies in Sarnath. He recently composed a
commentary on the Alambanaparīkṣā, reﬂecting on all of the previous
commentaries and drawing on the oral lineage preserved at Drepung
Loseling Monastic University where he studied, ﬁrst in Tibet and then in
India. Yeshes Thabkhas’ commentary is noteworthy both because of its
explicit reference to so many previous commentaries and because it, alone
among all of these commentarial texts, reads this text as having explicitly
ethical import.
Yeshes Thabkhas’ analysis of the two moons simile is quite complex,
and we will take it step by step.
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Suppose someone asks: How should we explain the epistemic framework of
object, intentional object, and percept with respect to a cognition apprehending
a single moon as a double moon?
The percept of a cognition that apprehends a double moon is the single
moon, but from the perspective of that cognition the single moon does not exist
as the percept. The object and intentional object that are apprehended by that
cognition refer to a double moon, not to a single moon.11 (p. 190)

At the beginning of his commentary, Yeshes Thabkhas discusses the
differences in meaning between don (intentional object), yul (object, or
referent) and dmigs pa (percept), pointing out that the text is in part aimed at
clarifying the relationship between these three terms, which in other, looser
contexts, might be treated as interchangeable. The intentional object is the
content of thought as conceived, the object under the description through
which it is engaged, whether that description is accurate or not. The object
(referent) is the thing to which the thought or perceptual state refers,
regardless of whether or not that referent is engaged correctly, and regardless
of the description through which it is engaged. The dmigs pa is whatever
satisﬁes the two criteria: that which appears and that which causes the
perceptual consciousness.12
These three can easily come apart, particularly in cases of illusion, but
even in veridical perception. Consider an example of perception as we
would ordinarily understand it. My wife and I each see a blue pot. From a
Geluk perspective—even if not from Dignāga’s—our respective visual
experiences share a referent. But I see it as a great example for an Indian
philosophical argument, and take that as my intentional object, and she sees
it as a superb bit of cobalt glazing, with an intentional object that only a
potter could entertain. Being a bit colorblind, the percept I experience is like
what I experience when I see the sky; hers, mediated by better vision, is
quite distinct from what she would have in seeing the sky. Perceptual
awareness, Yeshes Thabkhas emphasizes, is complex, and can only be
understood through this rich set of conceptual distinctions present in
Dignāga’s text (although they are not so thematized by any previous written
commentary, and although Dignāga would reject important features of the
example, such as the external pot as a common referent; but this is beside
the present point). The distinction has epistemological as well as phenomenological import, as Yeshes Thabkhas makes clear when he turns to the
double moon:
But, someone might continue, in the Sautrāntika system, because it distinguishes
between the object and the percept, it is easy to differentiate between correct
and incorrect with regard to cognitions. The object of cognition comprises such
things as forms, sounds, scents, and tastes; and the percept refers to the
representations of the objects that appear to those same cognitions. The
cognition that apprehends a double moon is a mistaken cognition because
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although the percept of that cognition does not exist in the single moon, a
double moon appears as though it exists in its object.
Therefore, while a cognition that apprehends a single moon is correct,
because a single moon appears in its percept, the single moon is also its object.
(p. 190)

We can understand the difference between perceptual error and veridical
perception from the Sautrāntika pespective, Yeshes Thabkhas argues, in terms of
the congruence between percept and intentional object. When the intentional
object is congruent with the percept, perceptual awareness is correct; when
they are discordant, it is erroneous. That is, when the description under which I
cognize the intentional object of perceptual experience is consistent with the
perceptual appearance and the nature of the cause of the perceptual awareness,
I can be said to correctly perceive; when it is inconsisent, error intrudes. The
Sautrāntika are realists, and this realism is evident in this criterion. But when we
abandon realism for idealism in Yogācāra, Yeshes Thabkhas continues, the
epistemology must be formulated differently:
In Dignāga’s system, however, percept and intentional object do not refer to
two different things. Because both are posited as stable predispositions internal
to cognition, it would seem to be difﬁcult to distinguish which might be
erroneous with regard to cognition.
So, in this system, how should we posit the difference between an erroneous
cognition that apprehends a double moon and a correct cognition that
apprehends a single moon?
Irrespective of whether or not external objects exist, a single moon performs
its function just as it is seen, whereas a double does not perform its function in
terms of how it appears. We can therefore understand from this that the
cognition apprehending a single moon is correct and the cognition apprehending a double moon is erroneous. (pp. 190–191)
[I]n Dignāga’s system, because percept and object are a single entity, from the
perspective of a cognition that apprehends a double moon both the object and the
percept condition are just that double moon. So the double moon is the cause that
produces that cognition, and that cognition is also the cause that produces the
representation of the double moon. Therefore, in this system a nonexistent
phenomenon, a double moon, appears to be able to perform a function. So in
what way is a cognition that apprehends a double moon deceptive? Why isn’t it a
veridical cognition? In this system, with regard to cognition, it is not possible to
present a distinction between what is able or unable to perform a function in terms
of whether the percept of a cognition and its object are similar or dissimilar. One
might say: “Because there is no way to do this, it does not seem to be clear how
one might posit a criterion for error with regard to cognition.” (p. 192)

On Yeshes Thabkhas’ reading, the consequence of Dignāga’s denial that the
percept is external is that the distinction between object, intentional object,
and percept collapses. There is only one aspect to perceptual experience in
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Dignāga’s view, and that is the maturation of a potential for experience in
the foundation consciousness. Nonethless, he points out, the Yogācāra must
be able to distinguish between correct and incorrect perception. After all,
Dignāga is the person who brings pramāṇavāda into Buddhist philosophy.
And so, returning to the double moon, Yeshes Thabkhas argues that only a
pragmatic criterion is available for distinguishing error from correctness.
Acting on the basis of the perception of a single moon will be effective;
acting on the basis of a double moon will not be. This pragmatism is forced,
he argues, by the idealism. And once again, like Gungtang and Dendar,
Yeshes Thabkhas will endorse the ensuing pragmatism, while he himself
rejects the idealism to which he acknowledges Dignāga is committed,
treating Dignāga’s text as a source of insights into perceptual experience that
are independent of the broader doctrinal position from which it emerges.
A bit later in his commentary on this passage, Yeshes Thabkhas, like his
Geluk predecessors, asks what even a Mādhyamika can learn from this
analysis. He points out that this pragamatism allows us to understand both
the plurality of reasonable perspectives on a single object and the way that
epistemology grounds ethical response:
The single moon is able to perform a function just in the way one experiences a
single moon. The experience of the single moon as a double moon, a hundred
moons, and so forth cannot perform its function. This fact can be understood
clearly from the way in which the six kinds of beings each see and experience
things differently. In general, things such as forms and sounds are sentient
beings’ means of livelihood or resources. Depending on these resources, they
encounter various sensations, either pleasant or unpleasant. From these pleasant
and unpleasant sensations, various cognitions, such as desire and aversion,
arise. (p. 192)

Shifting back to a Geluk Madhyamaka realist perspective, Yeshes Thabkhas
retains the pragmatist epistemology demanded by Dignāga. For the realism
that emerges at this level is a different kind of realism from that of
Sautrāntika. The external world is taken for granted, but it is an external
world the ontology of which depends upon conceptual imputation, and
hence on the cognitive stuctures, purposes, and interests of the beings who
inhabit it. According to this view, not only is truth determined pragmatically,
but so is ontology. We can recover the analytical distinction between object,
intentional object, and percept, but that distinction is to be used for the
analysis of experience, not for epistemology; it is a descriptive, not a
normative distinction. Epistemological assessment must remain pragmatic.
This is because different kinds of beings perceive the world very
differently. My dog, whose consciousness and ontology is determined by the
dominance of his brain by his olfactory bulb, inhabits a world I can barely
imagine, and he has the same difﬁculty imagining my world, try as he might
to do so.13 The bee outside my window lives in a different world yet. We
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may share some, but not all (referent) objects, but probably no intentional
objects, and our percepts may vary widely. To make sense of these profound
differences, these categories are necessary, but they tell us nothing about
veridicality or deceptiveness. There is no Archimedean epistemic fulcrum
that would allow any of us to say that our world is the real world, and
that the others are deluded. Rather, correctness and error emerge for each of
us—human being, dog, and bee—within the respective world of each, and
can only be measured by the effectiveness of cognitive and perceptual states
in guiding action.
But even within a single human world, there are ethical implications of
this perceptual variation. Ethical cultivation, as both Candrakīrti and
Sāntideva emphasize, is a matter of cultivating perceptual skills (Garﬁeld
2010/2011, 2012, 2015). Later in his commentary, Yeshes Thabkhas points
out that the same person may be seen by different subjects as a friend or as
an enemy, that a situation may be seen as pleasant or as unpleasant,
depending on one’s state of mind, just as Dendar points out that it is the
state of our perceptual systems that determines whether there are two moons
or only one. So, he argues, if we ask, in these situations, what the correct
perception is, we can’t be asking for an independent standpoint from which
to assess the qualities of the object. Instead, we have to ask a pragmatic
question: in each case, we can ask what attitudes, what behaviors, are most
adaptive and advance our ends. The criterion of truth is always pragmatic,
and normativity enters the picture through pragmatic considerations as well.
The suggestion, of course, is that there are ways of seeing and acting that
are dysfunctional (akusala) and ways of seeing and acting that are facilitative
of beneﬁt (kusala). And only this pragmatic criterion makes any sense in
ethics as well as in epistemology.
This recent commentary hence builds on its predecessors in using
the double moon simile both phenomenolgically and epistemologically.
But Yeshes Thabkhas takes the two moons in a very different direction
than his predecessors, and so interprets the Ālambanapariīkṣā as an
ethical, and not simply an epistemological text. That single object
becomes very different intentional objects in the minds of its successive
commentators.

VI. What Do We Learn from These Ten Moons?
Exploration of this commentarial history, a history of interpretation of a
single simile deployed in a text comprising only eight verses, reveals just
how rich such a simile can be when deployed in a scholastic tradition. One
issue raised by the doxographic hierarchy constructed in the Tibetan
tradition is how we should understand philosophical systems lower in the
hierarchy than the Madhyamaka, often represented as the only correct view.
The three Tibetan commentaries on the Ālambanaparīkṣā provide an answer
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to this. They all agree with Vinītadeva that this is an idealist text, and so
none of them would endorse its ontology. But, perhaps taking a hint from
Sāntarakṣita, they each suggest that while the ontology of Yogācāra is to be
rejected, the phenomenology and epistemology it deploys are to be taken
very seriously.14 Among the intriguing ideas that emerge from this exploration is that of the opacity of the mind and the possibility of cognitive as well
as perceptual illusion; another is the need for the distinction between
referent, intentional object, and percept in making sense of perceptual
experience.
We also might ﬁnd here a surprising lesson. The epistemology of the
pramāṇavāda school is known for its insistence that there are only two
pramāṇas, namely pratyakṣa (perception) and anumāṇa (inference), and that
the others endorsed by Nyāya, namely upamāna (analogy) and sabda
(knowledge through language, or testimony), can be reduced to these two.
Candrakīrti famously disagrees, and in the Prasannapadā endorses the full
Nyāya set of four pramāṇas. Here we might see him vindicated, and
vindicated by a pramāṇavāda text and its commentaries. The simile of the
double moon turns out to be a remarkable source of insight, and it, of
course, as it is used in the literature we have been surveying, is a paradigm
of upamāna (analogy): it is used by each of the commentators to give us
knowledge about the unknown through its similarity in an important respect
to the known. And its value only becomes evident through an extended
commentarial tradition, a paradigm of sabda, or knowledge through
linguistic activity, activity that it is hard to reduce to mere inference. So,
Dignāga may have unwittingly given aid and comfort to a more liberal
epistemology than his own.
We also ﬁnd here conﬁrmation of the view ably defended by Cabezón
(1994 and 1998) regarding scholastic traditions. They are not conservative
bulwarks against departure from classical texts. Instead they are progressive
sequences of texts that draw increasingly sophisticated ideas from richly
suggestive texts. To read the eight verses of Dignāga’s root text is to see
crude ore. Only the careful mining of that vein and patient smelting of that
ore by a sequence of commentators reveals the gold it contains. And we
may be surprised to ﬁnd that some of what is of value in a text that
appears only to investigate the nature of the percept in perception is in fact
ethical.
This should not be all that surprising. After all, epistemology, phenomenology, and ethics are closely intertwined in Buddhist thought. We can only
understand our moral life in the context of our cognitive lives, and so the
investigation into perceptual consciousness that Dignāga initiates leads
inevitably to questions about moral consciousness. When Yeshes Thabkhas
moves from two moons to six realms, and then to moral perception, he is
following a path blazed by Sāntideva. The most important cycling between
the six realms is not the cosmological, but the psychological. When in the
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animal realm of reactivity in anger, those around us may appear very
differently from the way they do when we are in the relaxed devaloka of a
beach vacation or in the neurotic state of a preta. To ask which set of
percepts is the most accurate, which matches reality most perfectly, may be
the wrong question. If Yeshes Thabkhas is correct, the better question to ask
is how, in whatever state we ﬁnd ourselves, we can most effectively engage.
That may bring us back to humanity, and that route to human consciousness
may be the path Dignāga indicates, even if that indication requires a bit of
interpretation.
Notes
This essay derives from joint research conducted with the support of a grant
from the Australian Research Council, in collaboration with John Powers,
Douglas Duckworth, Malcolm David Eckel, Yeshes Thabkhas, and Sonam
Thakchöe. I thank audiences at the University of California at Berkeley,
Temple University, the Five College Buddhist Studies Faculty Seminar, and
Harvard University, as well as the International Workshop on Buddhist
Philosophy and Consciousness at National Chengchi University for helpful
comments. Thanks also to two anonymous reviewers for this journal for very
helpful suggestions that improved this essay.
1 – Duckworth et al. 2016, p. 42. All translations are from this work.
2 – For a detailed discussion of this argument see Duckworth et al. 2016,
esp. chaps. 1 and 4.
3 – It is unclear what the origin of this twofold criterion is, but it is clear
that by Dignāga’s time it is taken for granted in Indian epistemology.
And it makes perfectly good sense. After all, if my putative perceptual
experience of a person is caused by the sight of a bear in the distance,
we can’t say that my percept is a person, since no person is the cause
of that experience; moreover, the percept is not a bear, since even
though the bear causes the experience, it does not appear. But when a
bear causes the experience and a bear appears to my perceptual
consciousness, it makes sense to say that the bear is the percept. At
least at ﬁrst pass. But only at ﬁrst pass, for the epistemology of
perception is tricky, and that is what motivates the Ālambanaparīkṣā.
4 – Dharmapāla’s commentary is lost in Sanskrit and was never translated
into Tibetan. It does exist in two Chinese translations. Vinītadeva’s
commentary exists in Tibetan. All extant Tibetan commentaries and
translations into English are to be found in Duckworth et al. 2016.
5 – See Cabezón 1994 and 1998 for more on the nature of Tibetan
scholasticism.
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6 – Via Dharmapāla, on whose own commentary Vinītadeva is composing
a subcommentary.
7 – An internal cognitive object/Which appears to be external, is the
object/Because it is cognition itself,/And because it is its condition.
8 – Note that this does not entail idealism; so far, it is neutral between a
representational and an idealist view of perception.
9 – It is also just as controversial in the Buddhist world as it is in the
contemporary world.
10 – One might object at this point that Dendar is overlooking the
distinction between an illusion and a hallucination, and that in the
case of the double moon we have a case of illusion, in which the real
single moon plays a crucial causal role. In this case, the argument
can’t succeed as an argument against the reality of the external world,
since the external single moon is presupposed. But this would be to
miss the point of Dendar’s deployment of the simile.
Dendar is not an idealist; he is deploying the simile not to show that
there are no external conditions for perceptual consciousness, but to
show instead that the casually salient conditions for understanding the
nature of our experience are internal cognitive processes. If we want to
understand why we are seeing double, or why things appear differently
to us than they do to a dog or to a bee, we do not look to the external
world, but to the inner world. That is Dendar’s point. He is not
recapitulating Dignāga, but is making creative use of Dignāga’s simile.
11 – Yeshes Thabkhas seems to be following Ngawang Dendar’s lead on
this point, but his interpretation is not uncontroversial. According to
Dignāga, both singularity and multiplicity with regard to a percept are
conceptual constructs. According to the Abhidharma, no wholes are
substantially real. A single moon is neither really one nor many: from a
Sautrāntika perspective, it is merely a representation perceived as
singular, double, or multiple. A single moon is neither one nor many
because it is not substantially real, and so it cannot serve as a percept.
According to the external realism of Sautrāntika, as it is understood
in the Gelugpa doxographical system within which Gungtang, Dendar,
and Yeshes Thabkhas are all working (which may not be an accurate
representation of Indian Sautrāntika), the percept is ineffable particulars, not macro-objects extended in space and time. And according to
Cittamātras, the percept of a double (or single) moon is a purely mental
phenomenon that arises from internal predispositions, and so in this
system it is also not substantially real. Yeshes Thabkhas may be
interpreting Dignāga in terms of Gelukpa-Mādhyamika semi-realism—
that is, the notion that conventionally real objects are conceptually
constructed percepts of cognition.
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12 – This set of distinctions, once again, is drawn within the framework of
Gelugpa epistemology and doxography, and should not be read back
uncritically into Dignāga. Once again, we have a case of creative
philosophical theory in response to Dignāga’s text, pursued through
the medium of the commentary, not simply repetition of what Dignāga
himself says.
13 – See Berns 2013 for a marvelous discussion of the neurophenomenology of dogs, and see Newland 2008 for a nice discussion of the
implications of differences in sensory apparatus for ontology.
14 – See Garﬁeld and Westerhoff 2015 for exploration of the relationship
between Madhyamaka and Yogācāra and in particular for essays
exploring the degree to which it is possible to reconcile the two
positions in this way.
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